Sacraments as Means of Justification

As Christians we believe the words of St. Paul when he says that sinners are justified by faith, and as Protestants we recognize that the added “sola fide” of the Reformation was not a novel invention meant to remove the human element in salvation, but a traditional way of adding emphasis to a word (see the line in Thomas Aquinas’ “Pange Lingua” – “Sola fides sufficit“), and in this case adding emphasis to the filial trust that believers have in the word of God who declares sinners to be “righteous” apart from their merits.

When God declares something about a sinner, he always uses inanimate and animate instruments to conveys that message. He used a burning bush to get his message across to Moses, and he used Moses to point Israel to that guiding flame and cloud, through the wilderness and into the Promised Land. And, it was through that divine fire and cloud that all of Israel were “baptized into Moses,” as St. Paul says (1 Cor. 10:2 – εἰς τὸν Μωϋσῆν ἐβαπτίσθησαν ἐν τῇ νεφέλῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ). All of these visible elements (the fire, the cloud, the sea, and Moses) were divine instruments and signs of Israel’s redemption. And, as St. Paul tells us, these signs correspond to the Christian sacraments, especially baptism. The sacraments are visible words spoken by God himself in sign language concerning the status of his people, saying, “I am their God, and they are my people.”

There really is no conflict between God’s objective sign language to us and our subjective seeing and hearing – faith comes through hearing. And so, there is no conflict in the doctrine of justification by faith alone and the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. Rather than detract from individual faith, the sacraments are actually given for the sake of bringing about faith (or in faithful adults, bringing about more faith), faith in God’s gracious declaration about us sinners, namely, that despite our sin we are righteous in Christ. There is a sense in which everyone who is baptized is justified, not through faith, plus sacraments, but because of their profession of faith in God’s word revealed through the sacraments. This is why they are called “means of grace.” Though this may come as a surprise to many, this is a Reformed view of baptismal efficacy. Jerome Zanchi says (in his Miscellanies) we are to believe that in baptism infants are washed with the very blood of Christ:

When the minister baptizes, I ponder and I believe, with the eyes of my mind lifted up to heaven, that Christ, as if with his own hand sent down from heaven, sprinkles my son with his own blood for the remission of his sins, through the hand of this man, who I see sprinkling the head of the infant with water.

We cannot talk about the remission of sins without talking about justification, since the very declaration included in God’s act of justifying sinners is his declaration that their sins are remitted. And, sins are remitted because we are united to Christ through the Holy Spirit that we receive in baptism. This applies to baptized infants as well, even though they are not capable of believing with their mind as adults do.

And therefore the infants of faithful [parents] receive the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of regeneration, the Spirit of faith & charity, as well as the remission of sins & the right to eternal life, since they become members of Christ when they are in the covenant. For it is not true that because they cannot believe due to the defect of their age, so they are destitute of the Spirit of faith, through whom they are regenerated. Just as it does not follow that because they cannot yet use reason, they lack a mind and reason (Zanchi, Commentary on Ephesians, 298).

Zanchi also affirms the appropriateness of attributing a power to the minister for regenerating and remitting sins, and justifying sinners through the sacraments:

Can the ministers of baptism also be said to truly baptize, that is, to wash away sins and to regenerate? I respond, yes in every way … But it should always be understood, that ministers do this sacramentally, that is, as they administer the sacraments, through whom Christ himself cleanses, regenerates, as through an instrument. And in the same sense it is said ministers are able to show forth not mere bread, but also the true body of Christ itself. For as it were, all who receive baptism, although hypocrites without true purification from sins, are said despite this to be cleansed from sins and justified because they have taken hold of the sacrament of these things. And so in the super of the Lord hypocrites, when they accept the bread of the Lord, can be said to also take up the body of Christ itself, namely sacramentally. Likewise ministers are also said to administer the things themselves, because they administer the sacraments of the things themselves. Therefore they justify and regenerate because they are ministers of these things and they serve the interests of Christ for the sake of regenerating humanity (Commentary on Ephesians, 305).

Zanchi’s qualifications here are very important. In every sacrament there is a mystical (or sacramental) union between the signum and res, between God’s sign language and the spiritual reality hidden behind the sign. In the crossing of the Red Sea God’s sign language (cloud, sea, and Moses) conveyed the hidden reality of Israel’s actual spiritual redemption and adoption into the family of God. And, in the same way, the sacraments act as God’s declarations to us today that he is our God and we are his people, that we are truly washed in the blood of the Lamb and clothed with his righteousness, and justified (declared “righteous”) in him. But, the sacraments do not work magically or automatically, otherwise they would not be sacraments (i.e., they require a real distinction between sign and thing signified). We know from experience (e.g., Judas) that the reality is not always given with the sign to everyone automatically and indiscriminately. Some, for example, “eat and drink to their own damnation”, while others participate in the full reality of blessed union with Christ, but all receive the sacrament, i.e., the sign mystically united to Christ himself.

And, unless someone might want some evidence for this view from an Anglican theologian, I’ve translated a passage from Samual Ward’s De baptismatis infantilis, British delegate to the Synod of Dort – there was obviously disagreement regarding this language, as Ward’s debate with Thomas Gataker attests. Ward’s language here is less guarded than Zanchi’s, but it is dependent on the same sacramental relationship, namely, the turn of phrase whereby we can refer to the sign as if it were the thing signified (i.e., metonymy):

All baptized infants are without doubt justified.

It is asked at present about the particular effect of baptism on infants [parvuli]; namely, whether it has without doubt this effect on infants, that it is effective for a solution to the guilt of original sin.

[F]irstly we assert it to be certain that Christ instituted the sacrament of baptism for an antidote [remedium] for original sin, and for a true solution to the guilt of the same.

Even if “antidote” taken strictly is the antidote of some illness, nevertheless even that can be called an “antidote,” which removes any evil whatsoever; whether it be of guilt, or penalty, or even of an obligation with regard to a penalty, which is called “guilt.” So theologians say that Christ came “for an antidote for sin,” as well for removing guilt through satisfaction on the cross as removing defect [culpam] through healing grace.

According to Ward, therefore, since God remits original sin in the baptism of infants, he also without doubt justified them.

Ward and Zanchi remind us that we ought to have a deep reverence and holy fear about God’s holy sacraments, not attributing too little to them nor too much. Everyone who is baptized in the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit is justified in a sacramental sense, and so God calls them to believe that they truly share in Christ’s righteousness – and the Father’s declaration to Christ, “This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased.” The mystery of the sacraments is in God’s work. There is no mystery in the evil of man. When someone spurns the gift of justification offered to them in their baptism, they reveal their own evil, not the weakness of God. Their unbelief, that is, does not detract from the mystery of their sacramental justification (to use Zanchi’s language). The sign and the thing are conjoined in God’s declaration and offering, and we should be very cautious in saying otherwise. In fact, that is why the condemnation of a lapsed Christian is greater than the unbeliever who has never been baptized. When it comes to the sacraments it is better to err on the side of mystery than on the side of presumptuousness. Because, as Zanchi says, the ministers of God “administer the sacraments of the things themselves.”


Zanchi: The Logic of Union with Christ

Zanchi argues that we approach Christ’s divine person in a logical order. That is through the mediation of his humanity. In a treatise of his translated into English in 1594 entitled An excellent and learned treatise, of the spirituall mariage betvveene Christ and the church, and every faithfull man, Zanchi explains his justification for this idea. I offer below a brief selection of his argument to emphasize that for Zanchi the preaching of the Holy Scriptures and the administration of the sacraments play a key role in the church’s union with Christ, precisely because of this logical order of cognition. Zanchi is intentionally setting himself apart from the Zwinglians, who he says believe that the faithful are only united to Christ’s divinity, and the Lutherans who he says believe that Christ has an invisible body, which is not capable of nourishing us since it is completely unlike our bodies.

1. A faithfull man is first joyned to the flesh of Christ, and then afterwardes by the flesh, he is joyned to the word it selfe, or to the Godhead.

2. The reason is taken from knowledge. As it is with knowledge and the understanding of the minde, so is it also with voluntarie uniting and coupling. For the will followeth knowledge, and so far forth chooseth, willeth, and embraceth any thing, and uniteth it selfe thereto, as it doth thoroughlie understand and knowe the same. For it alwayes desireth not unknown but known good. But we do first and sooner apprehend & know Christ propounded in the word of God as he is man, then as he is God. Therefore in a certaine order of nature, and of the actions of teh minde and of faith, wee are first united to the flesh of Christ, and by that to his deitie, and so to his whole person.

3. I easily proove [this]…from the holy Scriptures. For, when God in the beginning of the world did promise a Redeemer, he promised and propounded him immediatly, as the seede of the woman, that is, as man, Gen. 3. “Her seede…shall bruise thy head.” So promised he also to Abraham: “In thy seede shall the nations be blessed.”


20. As therefore it was [in the Old Testament] the peoples dutie to come to the visible arke and there to wait and looke for the grace of God: so let no man hope for the grace of God, except he come to Christ visible man, and eate his visible flesh, and doe incorporate the same into himselfe by faith.

21. Wherefore it is clearer then the day light that a man cannot be united to the Godhead of Christ, except he be joyned to his humanitie, and to his flesh. For the flesh of Christ is the instrument of the Godhead, but it is this instrument onely, beeing taken and joyned inseparably into the unitie of the person.

22. This whole doctrine is very lively to be seene in the Sacraments, as it were in most cleere looking glasses.

23. There are two things in every sacrament: the visible signe, and the invisible grace: the earthly thing, and the heavenly. He that bringeth faith receiveth both.

24. But in what order? Even in the same, as they are propounded of God: by the signe we receive the thing signified: and by the earthly thing, we receive the heavenly thing: for God by the one doth offer the other.


And therefore that Chrsit doth still retaine his natural flesh, and doth imprint the virtue & efficacie, & as it were the image thereof, into our flesh, by communicating his holinesse with us, whereby we are made flesh of his flesh, and bones of his bones: also that he doth by the holy Ghost ingraffe our flesh into his flesh, & so quickneth our flesh by his flesh: and again, that the father doth communicate unto us nothing concerning salvation, but by the flesh of Christ truely and really communicated with us; and this they [i.e,. the church fathers] have prooved especially by the mysterie of the Supper of the Lord.

For as the bread is really and truly united unto us eating the same: so also is the flesh of Christ truly and in very deede united unto us who eate the same.


Because this union is made at the preaching of the Gospell in Baptisme, and in the Supper of the Lorde, therefore there are divers answeres made to this question [i.e,. the manner of how the union is made]. All confesse, that it is made at the preaching of the Gospell by faith alone: I say, an effectuall faith: neither is there any great controversie of the manner how it is made in baptisme: but there is no man ignorant how great contention there is even among those that professe Christ, of the manner how we are united to the flesh of Christ, and the flesh of Christ is united to us in the Supper of the Lord.


[We say] by faith also [Christ] is received of us into our harts, and we are united to him. Iohn 6. “Hee that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, abideth in me and I in him.” But hee is eaten and drunken by faith, as Christ in the same place expoundeth it, saying: “He that beleeveth in me shall never thirst.” Wee are therefore united to Christ by faith.

Wherefore, whether he be propounded to us in the Word, or in Baptisme, or in the Supper, Christ is alwaies united to us, and we unto him by his Spirit and by our faith… By the vertue & power of the same holy Spirit, we drinke in the supper, the blood of Christ, and growe together into one with him, and are quickened by his Spirit

‘Theology is Queen! and everything else a shadow!’: J.H. Alsted on the Contemplative/Active Life

In his Praecognitorum theologicorum… , J.H. Alsted admits that he lacks the words to adequately describe Theology. Not because Theology is less than the other sciences, arts, or activities of life. On the contrary, Alsted asserts that Theology contains all of these things and, because of this, it can only be described by one word: Wisdom. Yet, even wisdom does not fully express the inexpressible nature of Theology. The highest thoughts of contemplation, even when accompanied by faith, cannot attain the summit of this wisdom. Alsted, therefore, is forced to conclude, “We are left destitute, therefore, of the appropriate vocabulary.” He knows that Theology is revealed by nature and Scripture. He knows that Theology is unified by its object, i.e., God. It is not less than scientia, therefore.

Alsted is not worried that he has failed to prove that Theology is something more than a science, art, or a practice. On the contrary, he believes that when one traces the boundaries of ectypal theology – what we humans do – one begins to see its connection with archetypal theology, which is God’s very own knowledge of Himself. Mere humans, however, cannot see archetypal theology because of the blinding rays of God’s infinity. Alsted says, “We do not posit a definition of archetypal Theology but a quasi-definition, by analogy, according to our mode of understanding.” In fact one should use caution, even when talking about archetypal theology. “We ought not investigate archetypal Theology, but worship it.” When the faithful see the boundary of ectypal Theology, therefore, they lose the appropriate vocabulary by which they may describe it. Faith is through a glass darkly after all.

Alsted concludes that Theology is not a mere activity, but it so far transcends our powers of contemplation that it comes full circle, so to speak, and manifests itself in action. Theology is hyper-contemplative [hyper-theoreticam] and hyper-speculative [superspeculativam]. “For,” Alsted says, “the highest and final thought by which I know that I see God, that I am conformed to Him, that I will always rejoice [in Him], this is not mere [nuda] contemplation but active contemplation [contemplatio actuosa]. When you have weighed this matter carefully in this way, join with me in exclaiming, ‘Theology is Queen! and everything else is like a shadow!'” (Praecog…, 63). Thus, for Alsted the height of contemplation is not an absence of thought or action but a coincidence of thought-action which stems from the experience of seeing God and rejoicing in Him as he is manifest within one’s own soul. This, he says, is “active contemplation.”

Zanchi on Union with God

What does Paul mean in Ephesians 3:19 when he says “that you may be filled with all the fullness of God?” Girolamo Zanchi, in his Commentary on Ephesians, interprets Paul to mean that believers are partakers of the divine nature, a participation which depends upon one understanding “the mysteries of piety and its causes, that is, by understanding the love of God in Christ toward us.” This is not a bare cognitive assent, however, but is combined with an experience [sentio] of the love of God within one’s “inner man” by means of grace. Zanchi, like Aquinas, considers union with God to occur primarily through a certain created likeness of God within the soul, or in other words, a renewal of the image of God in the soul by means of certain infused qualities (i.e., wisdom, righteousness, etc.). He explains what it means to be “filled with the fulness of God”:

Translation: Girolamo Zanchi on Ephesians 3:19

By what, then, do we become strong? By a power and virtue, not human, but divine. So, [Paul] says, “that you may be strengthened with power, that is, of God.” Therefore, all of the virtues are excited within us, they stand upright, and are nourished by the power [δυνάμει] and virtue of God, and these are really nothing other than a certain divine power created, excited, and inflamed through the Holy Spirit within us, by which [we are] good, strong, wise, righteous, and finally, we are such as God wants us to be, and by which we have the ability, whatever ability we have, [to be] good. This is the power [δυνάμιν] of God that Peter calls the divine nature: “That you may become (Peter says) partakers of the divine nature.” By the word “nature” here [Peter] means a created quality by which we become like God. Paul calls [it] grace: “By the grace of God I am what I am & his Grace in me was not vain” (1 Cor. 15).

Zanchi, In d. Pauli epistolam ad Ephesios Commentarius, 1594, p. 201.

J.H. Alsted: The Light of Reason and the Light of Faith

At the Calvinist International I’ve published another in my series of posts in which I translate portions from J.H. Alsted’s Theologia naturalis. Here’s an excerpt from Alsted on how the light of reason relates to the light of faith:

Pious men explain this by means of an apposite similitude: They say, just as the sunlight does not put out the [light] of the stars but makes their lesser light yield to a more abundant light, so the light of Grace does not put out the light of Nature but makes it yield. And again, just as the stars yield to the Sun so that they do not fall from the sky, so reason yields to faith so that it does not fall from the sky of the microcosm. Let [faith] cease, if you will, and [reason] falls. The little torch of reason acknowledges its inferiority to grace coming forth from the celestial chamber as to the Sun, the superior of the stars. But, [the soul] does not cast away a power innate to it with the arrival of [grace], any less than the stars do not cast away their own power of shinning with the arrival of noon.

17th Century List of Readings on the Use of Reason in Matters of Faith

Voetius It is a rare occasion to find a list of recommended readings in a 17th century author. Usually, authors of this period were silent about their sources. In published disputations, however, one often finds references and even lists such as these. Below I have translated one such list from the Dutch Reformed theologian Gisbertus Voetius. I trust you will find his references to be quite interesting, especially (to me at least) Raymund of Sabunde and Nicholas of Cusa. The following excerpt is taken from the disputation, “De ratione humana in rebus fidei” in which Voetius discusses the proper use of reason in matters of faith. Enjoy!

Gisbertus Voetius, Selectarum disputationum theologicarum

I add that [reason is used in matters of faith] for directly opposing false Theology, consequently and indirectly defending the one truth, that is, by removing impediments and prejudices, and so for strengthening the way of truth. Such a defense of the Faith appears in [the following authors of antiquity]:

1. Athenagoras

2. Justin Martyr

3. Clement of Alexandria

4. Origen

5. Tertullian

6. Arnobius

7. Lactantius

8. Augustine

9. Theodoret

10. Cyril of Alexandria, and others.

Also, writers of the Middle Ages [include]

1. Thomas [Summa] contra gentes, and the rest of the Scholastics, if they are chosen discriminatively and judiciously;

2. Also, Savanorola in his Book on the Triumph of the Cross

3. Raymund of Sabunde in [his] Natural Theology

4. Cardinal [Nicholas] of Cusa

5. Dionysius the Carthusian

6. And others [who argue] against the Muhamedans

And finally, more recent [authors]:

1. Juan Louis Vives

2. Augustino Steucho

3. Pierre Charron

4. Scholastic investigations and commentators on Lombard and Thomas

The Civic Sphere is Essentially Good: Bartholomäus Keckermann on Moral Philosophy (pt. I)

Few modern scholars have recognized the importance of Bartholomäus Keckermann in the history of European thought. Richard Muller has defended Keckermann against those who claim complete discontinuity between his thought and that of the earlier Reformers, noting that what we find in Keckermann is a “rationalization of the Reformers.” He was heavily influenced by Scholastics (Scotus, Thomas, and others) and therefore was not opposed to natural theology, all the while recognizing the difference between truth secundum rationem and truth secundum fidem.

Joseph Freedman has written a short biography of Keckermann including a bibliography of all of his writings and the libraries that published his works in the “Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,” vol. 141. In this article Freedman traces Keckermann’s journey from Gdansk (a.k.a. Danzig) Poland to Wittenburg to Leipzig to Heidelberg and finally back to Gdansk. Freedman notes that Keckermann’s writings have been all but forgotten today, but in the 17th century he was well known in Europe, Britain, and among the Puritans in Massachusetts. During his lifetime he published numerous works on Theology, Ethics, Politics, Astronomy, Geometry, Mathematics, Optics, among others. He was one of the first to write an Applied Logic textbook, which also included a history of Logic. He was among the earliest to discuss philosophical disciplines in terms of “system” rather than scientia, thus contributing to the initiation of the modern concept of individual subjects. Closely related to that point is the fact that Keckermann was also one of the first to stress that every discipline has its own history.  And, although he was highly indebted to the scholastics, his work in local gymnasia and his writings on the civic sphere – this is a point I hope to bring out in this post – prove that Keckermann was both scholastic and civic humanist.

The subject of this post concerns Keckermann’s civic humanism, specifically with regard to his treatment of civic virtue in Systema Ethicae. The following quote is from the prolegomena of that book and is my own translation. Concerning the relationship between Ethics and Theology, Keckermann notes:

There is a distinction of steps between Ethical virtues and Theological, so that, what concerns the virtues of Ethics may be increased and completed by means of Theologcal discipline.

A very serious question occurs here; Whether the virtues of Ethics, and even Ethical beatitude, have some connection and coherence with the virtues of Theology, especially since Augustine says in book 15, chapter 25 of City of God, “unless virtues are referred to God they are not virtues.” And Jerome, “Without Christ every virtue is a vice.” [Lambert] Daneau also treats in book one, chapter one of Christian Ethics concerning these things. But, one must distinguish between that which is essential (per se) and that which is accidental (per accidens). Virtue per se and also the act of moral virtue is actually something good and the image of God in man; and also a certain grade of Theological virtue, which is the consumation and completion of moral virtue. Nor in another way does one have moral virtue for the purpose of spiritual virtue or Theological, any more than he has warmth for the purpose of extreme heat or mourning light for the purpose of midday light. Therefore in the same way that warmth is true heat, even if it may not be so much heat as extreme heat; and in the same way that mourning light is true light, even if it may not be so much light as midday light; So moral virtue is essentially true virtue, and true good, even if it is not so much virtue or so much good, as the virtue and good that is spiritual or Theological. Whence it follows that civic virtue should not be condemned nor should vice be encouraged, but rather it should be completed by piety as the more excellent step should be added to the lower step.

Here Keckermann treats an issue that has been discussed by every Christian theologian since before Augustine. How do we understand that apparent dichotomy between the City of God and the City of Man? Augustine is often quoted as an extremist on the matter, as if he saw nothing good in the world outside of the cathedral doors. Keckermann was known as an Aristotelian, yet he also pointed out (as all good humanists did) that Aristotle needed to be adapted for use in the modern world. As we know today – this was unknown to Early Modern philosophers – the writings of Aristotle in our possession today were most likely class notes that were compiled by his students. This makes for quite atrocious Greek prose and, in parts, inexplicably nebulous discourse. Keckermann considered it his duty, as did divines such as Melanchthon and Daneau (to a certain extent), to make Aristotle relative to his day by writing textbooks on his philosophy in a “systematic” way. Part of this systematic way of thinking is the distinction between what exists essentially and what exists accidentally. This distinction is necessary for the doctrine of original sin as well as that of the civic sphere. The virtue that men and women are able to acquire as citizens is essentially good and truly virtuous. It is only bad insofar the individual citizen has corrupted what is good in themselves. Civic virtue is on a step below Theological virtue but that does not mean that the former exists for the latter. Civic or moral virtue exists for the greatest good of the state and Theological virtue exists for the greatest good of the Church universal. Yet, Theological virtue does perfect and complete Civic virtue. The two are not completely distinct. Keckermann continues:

And on the other hand I will concede willingly that many more things should be patched onto this teaching, which Aristotle and other Heathen have handed down concerning virtue, from out of the Scriptures, by means of which this teaching handed down by the Heathen is completed, and also corrected; That which should be done not only in Ethics, but also in Economics, Politics, indeed also Natural Philosophy and other disciplines. Accordingly as we have advised in its place, the Scriptures contain not only Theology but also Ethics, Economics, Politics, Natural Philosophy, and Astronomic theorums. Neither do I dissaprove of the famous instruction of the most intelligent men Philip Melanchthon, Lambert Daneau, and other of our instructors, who have instituted the combination of moral and spiritual goods, i.e., Ethics and Theology, if only in this combination the distinction may remain between that which is in reality Ethics and that which in reality pertains to Theology. Per accidens of course, by reason of this subject, in which Ethics resides, it can happen that virtue might degenerate into vice, or that he who is gifted with the beatitude of the citizen will be damned for eternity, not by the guilt of virtue, but by his own guilt. Because, of course, he did not add spiritual good to moral good; and because he did not direct moral virtue to the worship of God, neither did he exercise virtue out of faith in Christ, without which no one can please God (understood for eternal salvation). For insofaras he keeps his life for society, Scipio pleased God more certainly than Sardanapalus, nor is it doubted that Scipio’s eternal punisment will be more tolerable than that of Caligula, Nero, and Sardanapalus.

Melanchton and Daneau both wrote compendiums of Christian Ethics in order to explain the relationship between Ethics and Theology and for the purpose of encouraging others toward virtue. Here Keckermann mentions these two and refers to them as “our instructors” even though the former was not strictly speaking a Calvinist as Keckermann was. Next, Keckermann gives examples of virtuous pagans such as Scipio, who was known for his ethical treatment of captured enemy forces – it was also claimed that he refused to take a captured woman as war spoils and even returned her to her fiancé. Keckermann is so much in favor of Civic virtue and its function for the good of society that he speculates on the severity of Scipio’s punishment in contradistinction from that of Sardanapalus – a man of controverted identity who Keckermann most likely believed to be an Assyrian king characterized by his love of pleasure and sloth – and Nero. One can only think of Dante’s Paradiso, which perhaps Keckermann had read, in which Dante has a conversation with the Roman emperor Justinian. In that dialogue Justinian mentions Scipio among other Roman leaders who set the standard for how to rule virtuously. He then accuses the Italians of Dante’s time of going against that standard in their violence toward one another. Scipio’s punishment will be less than that of the Ghibellines. In the next post I will mention Keckermann’s disagreement with Juan Louis Vives and the definition of eudaimonia.