Peter Martyr’s Rules for the Right Use of Images

Baptism of Jesus by Da Vinci
The Baptism of Jesus by Da Vinci

Peter Martyr’s philosophy of images in worship is a portrayal of the typical Reformed view. He cites Epiphanious and Jerome as church fathers who agree with his position, that images should not be used in worship because men are already inclined toward idolatry. Images provoke the senses, and because of that they are less profitable than those sources that lift up our minds to contemplation.  On the other hand, Vermigli does not disallow images of Christ and the apostles, so long as they are confined to the economic sphere.

Wherefore, my opinion is, that images oughte utterly to be removed out of holy temples. But in other places there may be some use of them. At the least, they may bring an honest pleasure, which may have some utilitie ioyned with it, if they represent those thinges whiche are monuments and examples of pietie. But they are in no case to be suffered, no not in other places also, if they shoulde become occasions of idolatrye. For then must we always imitate Ezechias. Neither ought we at any tyme to attribute more unto them, then unto the holy scriptures. For who falleth downe uppon hys knees, and worhippeth the booke eyther of the new Testament or of the olde? None undoubtedly, which is godly wise. And yet in them both, Christ and also the workes of God are more truely and expressedly set forth unto us to contemplate, than they are in all the images of the world. Neither is this to be passed over, that the maner of having images came unto us rather from the Ethnikes, then from the practice of holy men. (Peter Martyr Vermigli, Commentary upon the Epistle to the Romanes, p. 32.)

Statue of St. George that Martyr says may be used for its allegorical meaning.
Image of St. George which Martyr says may be used for its allegorical meaning.

He continues to give two principles that the pious Christian should follow when seeking artwork for use within the sphere of the home or school:

And also if we have images privately, two other thinges also ought diligently to be taken hede of. First, that they be not lying images, so that under the title and name of sayntes, they represent not those which ever were extant. Suche as are the signes of George, of Christopher, of Barbara, and of such lyke, which are by images and pictures obtruded as sayntes, when as there is nothyng found, of certainty touching them. Nowbeit, I deny not, but that some things may sometimes be painted, which may by an allegoricall signification profitably enstructe the beholders. Farther, we must beware that the pictures or tables be not filthy or wanton, wherewyth to delyght our selves, lest by the syght of them, should be provoked wicked lustes. (Ibid.)

As usual, Martyr’s discussion on this topic is a bit more moderate than some of the more iconoclastic Reformed divines who came after him. Yet, such stricture will always seem a bit authoritarian for our modern sensibilities. Vermigli and Calvin both hold to a much lower view of the senses than we are used to. Calvin even castigates the use of the imagination in general, an idea that receives a more moderate treatment by Vermigli. But, the somewhat iconoclastic spirit of the Reformers should not be taken out of context, as we often do. Here, Vermigli gives a more moderate view. The imagination was created good, and so long as it does not lead us to idolatry or over indulgence then religious images are permissible, outside of the church.

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Vermigli on Why the Natural Law Accuses Mankind

Peter Martyr VermigliVermigli affirms that the natural law accuses  man because of the corruption resulting from the loss of original righteousness.  He affirms against Pighius that there are three laws that bind our nature, thus rendering the lack of original righteousness a sin: (1) The institution of man as the imago Dei (image of God), which consists primarily in his endowment with the “divine properties” of justice, wisdom, goodness, and patience, (2) the law of nature that depends upon the original justice of the imago Dei, and (3) the Law of God.  (Commentary upon the Epistle to the Romanes, 124, 125) Vermigli explains why the second of these laws requires original righteousness:

We have also the law of nature, and to live agreably unto it (as Cicero saith in his 3. booke de finibus) is the principall and last end of mans estate.  And this lawe dependeth of that other law [original justice] which we before put:  For it commeth of no other thinge, that we have in our mind cogitations, accusing, and defending one another, but only for that they are taken of the worthiness of nature, as it was instituted of God.  For whatsoever Philosophers, or lawgivers have written of the offices of mannes life, the same wholy dependeth of the fountaines of our constitution.  For those precepts cannot come out of a corrupt nature, out of selfe love, and malice, hereby we are prone to evil:  but they come of that forme of upright nature, which they imagine is required of the dignity of man, and which we know by the scriptures was instituted of God, and commaunded of us to be renued. (ibid.)

Therefore, the natural law accuses mankind because we fail to live up to the justice with which man was originally endowed.  When the pagan philosophers wrote about man’s duties (i.e., offices) they believed that the precepts derived from the natural law could be fully kept by the prudent person.  However, Vermigli counters that an upright nature is a gift that must come from God.

Calvin and Vermigli on Adam’s Original Righteousness, pt. II

“Solummodo hoc inveni quod fecerit Deus hominem rectum et ipse se infinitis miscuerit quaestionibus quis talis ut sapiens est et quis cognovit solutionem verbi.” (Eccl. 7:30)

This verse from the Vulgata was read by the Western church for hundreds of years and interpreted to mean that Adam was created with supernatural gifts that directed him toward his ultimate end in the Heavenly Jerusalem.  Thomas Aquinas, John Calvin, and Peter Martyr Vermigli are among the many who implemented the clause, “God made man just,” in their theological writings as proof of Adam’s original righteousness.   

Thomas appealed to this verse in defense of his belief that Adam was not created in a state of mere nature but was created in grace.  He affirms that some believe that Adam was not created in grace but that grace only came after sin.  He responds that if Adam’s original righteousness was produced from nature the effect (supernatural qualities) would be greater than the cause (nature). (ST I, Q. 95, a. 1.)  According to Thomas, the belief that Adam was created in a state of mere nature is contrary to scripture, reason, and St. Augustine, who says:

For, as soon as our first parents had transgressed the commandment, divine grace forsook them, and they were confounded at their own wickedness … for though their members remained the same, they had shame now where hey had none before.  They experienced a new motion of their flesh, which had become disobedient to them, in strict retribution of their own disobedience to God. (De Civitate Dei, XIII.13) 

This paragraph from Augustine’s City of God provided the foundation for Thomas’s definition of original righteousness (although his definition was not novel). According to Thomas, Adam was created in obedience to God, a status that requires more than just natural gifts.  He explains:

For this rectitude [explained in Eccl. 7:30] consisted in his [Adam’s] reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul:  and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as Augustine says. Now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin; since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared.  (Ibid.)

This rectitude of the inward parts of man to reason and man to God is a supernatural rectitude that was given to Adam in his created state.  This right ordering is necessary because if man had been created in a state of pure nature he would not have been able to discover divine truths own his own nor acquire divine beatitude merely by natural effort.  His natural inclination toward the common good needed an addition of supernatural charity that directs the entire man toward the Heavenly City.  Thomas explains the different supernatural qualities necessary for man’s beatitude:

[T]o enable us to carry out activities that are ordered toward the end of eternal life, the following are divinely infused in us: first (i’) grace, through which the soul acquires a certain spiritual way of being; then (ii’) faith, hope and charity. Thus by faith, the intelligence may be enlightened concerning the knowledge of supernatural matters, which function at that level just as naturally known principles do at the level of our natural activities. By hope and charity, the will acquires a certain inclination towards that supernatural good; the human will just by its own natural inclination is not sufficiently ordered toward this. (Disputed Questions on the Virtues in General, A. 10, resp.)

This grace and these theological virtues are qualities that were divinely infused within Adam for the purpose of ordering him toward divine things and, should he pass the test, the vision of God. We should remember that when Thomas uses the verb “added” in reference to the grace infused in Adam he is speaking hypothetically, as if Adam existed apart from grace, a concept that Thomas never thought a reality.  Rather, Adam was created in a state of grace, meaning God created him ex nihilo with these virtues naturally engrafted. When it comes to the nature of original sin and Adam’s loss of original righteousness (which is the right order of man to himself and to God) Thomas follows both Anselm and Augustine.  In his Summa theologiae I-II, Q. 82 he asks if original sin is a habit. The first objection replies that original sin is not a habit because Anselm said that it is a privation, which is opposed to habit.  Thomas responds on the authority of Augustine that original sin is not only a privation of original righteousness but is a habit of concupiscence. He affirms:

As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so far as it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and partly something positive, viz. the very humors that are inordinately disposed, so too original sin denotes the privation of original justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul.  Consequently it is not a pure privation, but a corrupt habit. (ST I-II, Q. 82., a. 1.)

Thus original sin removes the supernatural qualities that ordered the soul toward God and his supernatural end while at the same time causing a habit of concupiscence within the soul.  Further in the Summa Thomas speaks of the “wounding of nature” in which all of the powers of the soul are disordered due to sin. (ST I-II, Q. 85, a. 3.)  The four parts of the soul each receive a wound which inclines man toward evil.  The intellect receives the wound of ignorance, the will receives malice, the irascible receives weakness, and the concupiscible receives concupiscence. The wound of original sin effects the entire person, not only one part of the soul.  Thomas confirms the material and formal elements of original sin:

[T]he privation of original justice, whereby the will was made subject to God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder of the soul’s powers, is a kind of material element in respect of original sin. Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul consists chiefly in their turning inordinately to mutable good; which inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence.  Hence original sin is concupiscence, materially, but privation of original justice, formally. (ST I-II, Q. 82, a. 3.)

Therefore, Thomas believed Adam to have been created in grace with supernatural virtues infused for the sake of attaining the ultimate end. When Adam sinned these gifts of grace were removed and his nature was wounded with a habit of concupiscence.  

Peter Martyr Vermigli, in his commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, also uses Ecclesiastes 7:30 as evidence that Adam was created in grace. He refers to that passage while defending Anselm’s position against Pighius.  Vermigli counters Pighius’s argument that the corruption of original sin is not hereditary but was natural to Adam, saying that the defects came when Adam sinned and his original righteousness was removed “for actions or doinges are not taken away from men, but the power to use them well is taken away.” (Commentarie upon the Epistle to the Romanes, p. 124.) Vermigli argues that sin does not naturally corrupt the whole person but the efficient cause of this corruption of original sin is the justice of God:

whereby the grace of the Spirite and heavenly gifts, wherewith man was endewed before hys fall, were removed from hym when he had sinned. And thys wythdrawing of grace, came of the iustice of God, althoughe the blame bee to bee ascribed to the transgression of the fyrst man: least a man shoulde straight way say that God is the cause of sinne. For when he had once withdrawen his giftes, wherewith he had adorned man straight way vices and corruptions followed of their owne accord, which were before farre from the condicion of man. (Ibid., p. 122.)

In this passage Vermigli affirms that Adam was created in a state of grace. He affirms the same notion in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where he disagrees with Aristotle’s statement that the virtues are produced and destroyed by and through the same things.  This was one of Aristotle’s arguments against Plato’s concept of innate virtue.  Concerning these things, Vermigli notes:

And whether virtues are present in us by nature is also a question.  If we speak of man as created by God (for all things made by him were supremely good), there can be no doubt that in his created state he was also equipped with virtues.  Just as the heavens did not remain without ornament and the land was immediately covered with plants, so man at his creation did not lack the appropriate virtues. With respect to vitiated and corrupt nature, however, these statements are true in the normal course of things and according to ordinary reason.  Aristotle, however was unable to see this corruption of our nature, since he was left without faith and the light of holy scripture … When it comes to the true virtues, such as faith, hope, charity, and the like, we must say that nothing prevents our nature, in spite of corruption, from being adorned with these charisms, provided that God himself deigns to inspire them. It is against human nature, however, to acquire these virtues by ourselves and through our own efforts. Moreover, it is not always true that we must have actions before we acquire virtues. We say this because of the first man and also because of those whom God immediately infuses with virtues from the moment of their conversion. (emphasis added) (Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, pp. 296, 297.)

Adam was created with the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, virtues that cannot be produced by nature but must come from God’s supernatural infusion of these qualities. Vermigli also believed that Adam was given the gifts of the Holy Spirit: fortitude, fear, and the inspirations of God – these are also mentioned by Thomas in ST I-II, Q. 68.  These things “surpass nature.” (Ibid., p. 336) Therefore, Adam did not have them by nature but “even then God himself, of his own benevolence and grace, gave Adam true virtues and adorned him with his beautiful gifts.” (Ibid.) 

Aside from disagreement over the definition of grace and the primacy of charity among the theological virtues Vermigli agrees with Thomas’s doctrine of original righteousness and original sin.  By grace, the lower parts of Adam’s soul were submissive to will and reason and the reason was submissive to God. He affirms, “And these men by Originall iustice understand nothing elles, then the right constitucion of man, when the body obeyeth the soule, and the inferiour partes of the soule obey the superiour partes, and the mind is subiect  unto God and to his law.” (Commentarie upon the Epistle to the Romanes, p. 124.)

Like Thomas, Vermigli combines the opinion of Anselm and Augustine in his definition of original sin: “…we have alleaged Augustines definition, that originall sinne is the concupiscence of the flesh, and Anselmus definition, that it is the want of originall iustice…” (Ibid., p. 129.) Furthermore, Vermigli adds his own definition to these in order to refute Pighius, who misinterpreted Augustine and Anselm, using them to defend his doctrine of pure nature. Therefore, Vermigli adds to, or more precisely, reiterates the classic doctrine of original sin in the following definition:  “Original sinne therefore is the corruption of the whole nature of man, traduced by generation from the fall of our first parent into his posterity, which corruption, were it not for the befefite of Christ, adiudgeth al men borne therein in a maner to infinite evills, and to externall damnation.” (Ibid., p. 125.)

According to John Patrick Donnelly, Vermigli’s definition “gives a new centrality and emphasis to total depravity which is distinctly Reformed.” (Calvinism and Scholasticism, p. 107.) However, Vermigli considered his definition to be a clarification and reiteration of Augustine and Anselm rather than a “distinctively reformed” definition. He affirms this later in his commentary:

With this our definition of originall sinne, wel agreeth the want of originall iustice.  Also with it agreeth the description of Augustine, wherein he saith , that it is the concupiscence of the flesh: so that either of them be rightly understanded. The chiefe of the Scholemen acknowledged this doctrine, as Thomas, Scotus, and in especiall Bonaventure. These appoint for the materiall part in this sinne, the corruption of nature, or concupiscence: and for the formal part, the want of original righteousnes: and so of these two opinions, which we have now rehersed, they make but one. (Ibid., p. 126.)

Here Vermigli confirms that his definition of original sin, and by concomitance original righteousness, is not distinctly Reformed, but in order to refute the Pelagianism of Pighius he emphasizes the essence of the church’s opinion  from Augustine to Scotus: sin does not only affect one part of the soul but the whole person. Neither did Vermigli consider his position terribly different from the Roman Church of his day.

But in this thing he [Pighius] semeth to contmemne the iudgement of his owne Romishe Church, which otherwise he every where maketh equall even, with God himselfe. For, that Church doth in such maner acknowledge originall sinne, that it suffereth not infantes dying without baptisme to be buried… (Ibid., p. 128.)

In conclusion, there is a surprising similarity between the Medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas and the Church Reformer Peter Martyr Vermigli on the nature of Adam’s original state and the corruption of human nature that followed his fall from grace. In this same commentary Vermigli does openly disagree with St. Thomas. However, his charge is not against a wrongheaded nature/grace distinction, rather an unbiblical definition of grace, a mistaking of the effects of grace for the cause (as Calvin also says). As I demonstrated in this post Vermigli believed that God created Adam in a state of grace with infused theological virtues that caused the submission of his passions to his will, his will to reason, and his reason to God. For Vermigli, as for Thomas, this original internal and external order of Adam is original righteousness. When Adam fell the supernatural gifts were removed and concupiscence corrupted or “wounded” his entire nature, thus leaving him utterly dependant on God’s healing grace. I hope to devote another short post to this same topic so that I may revisit Calvin in light of the current post and talk about the elements in both Vermigli’s and Calvin’s thought that are distinctively Reformed. 

Calvin and Vermigli on Adam’s Original Righteousness, pt. I

Within the spirit of the post below concerning snobbery, I suggest that we who rummage through the old dusty pages of theological and philosophical works of days long past adhere to the commonsensical maxim to never create a problem of diverging doctrinal paradigms where an author him/herself did not. For example, I have not read in any Reformer where he disagrees with the “papists” because they view Christ, man, and sin through a dualist nature/grace paradigm.  The anachronistic insertion of such a paradigm would amount to something similar to what C.S. Lewis termed “chronological snobbery.” Therefore, I vow not to insert a problem of dueling “worldviews” where Luther, et al. did not.  Steven has an excellent post for those wanting to know the problems of “worldview thinking.”

Rather than disagree with Rome because of its worldview Calvin and Vermigli opposed what may seem to us as non-essential if not insignificant doctrinal points. It is really easy for us to read the polemics of Luther or Calvin anachronistically, as if they would both be just as militant about some of these points were they living in 21st century Europe or America.  As James Davison Hunter points out, the religious situation in America is no longer divided between Protestant and Catholic, as it was in the 19th and earlier centuries. Rather, we are divided between those who adhere to the authorities of church or Bible and those who value the authority of reason and the freedom to critique supernatural authorities.  Sure, Protestants and Catholics are still divided in terms of doctrine and practice.  However, one can notice the change in rhetorical tone toward a spirit of mutual respect that did not exist for the Reformers.

I am somewhat grieved to bring up a “whipping boy” to accentuate my point, since he is someone who has taught me many things.  Herman Bavinck is that “boy.” First, I must emphasize my respect for Bavinck.  I agree with Richard Gaffin, that Bavinck’s is “Arguably the most important systematic theology ever produced in the Reformed tradition.”  With that said, I offer one critique. Bavinck makes the following statement concerning the Reformed understanding of Adam’s original state:

[For the Reformers] grace serves, not to take up humans into a supernatural order, but to free them from sin.  Grace is opposed not to nature, only to sin.  In its real sense, it was not necessary in the case of Adam before the fall but has only become necessary as a result of sin […] Grace does not give us any more than what, if Adam had not fallen, would have been acquired by him in the way of obedience.  The covenant of grace differes from the covenant of works in method, not in its ultimate goal.  It is the same treasure that was primised in the covenant of works and is granted in the covenant of grace.  Grace restores nature and takes it to its highest pinacle, but it does not add to it any new and heterogeneous constituents. (Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. 3:  Sin and Salvation in Christ, p. 577.)

Now, I must add one caveat to this quote, which I think is a misinterpretation of the Reformers:  Bavinck is critiquing the Catholic doctrine that Adam was created in a state of “pure nature.” According to this doctrine, man was originally created without supernatural gifts, his nature remains constant before receiving grace, while grace is given, and after grace has been removed because of the fall. Throughout the process Adam’s nature remains as it was created.  This was a position held by many Jesuits during the time of Francis Turretin.  Peter Leithart notes here that Turretin attributed this position to Pelagianism, both old and new – as did Vermigli.  Therefore, inasmuch as Bavinck critiques the notion of pure nature he is correct.  The Reformers did not hold to this position.  However, by stating that the Reformers did not believe Adam needed grace before the fall Bavinck misrepresents at least two Reformers:  John Calvin and Peter Martyr Vermigli.

Adam and EveCalvin affirms that Adam was created in the image of God with the “adornments” of wisdom, virtue, and justice, and he calls these the “gifts” which God “willed to be conferred upon human nature.” (Institutes, II.I.4-7.)  But, throughout the Institutes Calvin seems to equate man’s original state with human nature.  He seems to imply that Adam did not have sanctifying grace “superadded” to his nature. Rather, Adam was created with these gifts, and those gifts are natural. At this point I must state clearly that the word “nature” can cause much confussion.  What did Calvin mean by “nature”?  Fortunately, he gives us an idea of his definition when he explains the meaning of “corruption of nature”:  

Therefore we declare that man is corrupted through natural vitiation, but a vitiation that did not flow from nature.  We deny that it has flowed from nature in order to indicate that it is an adventitious quality which comes upon man rather than a substantial property which has been implanted from the beginning.  Yet we call it “natural” in order that no man may think that anyone obtains it through bad conduct, since it holds all men fast by hereditary right. (Ibid., II.I.11.) 

Here Calvin uses the word “nature” to refer both to man’s original state as created by God and his state after the fall. Adam has a nature before the fall and a nature after the fall, but he maintains the same nature/substance throughout.  In other words, his substance remains yet it receives the “adventitious quality” of original sin.  Calvin explains, “in man’s perverted and degenerate nature some sparks still gleam.  These show him to be a rational being, differing from brute beasts, because he is endowed with understanding.” (Ibid., II.II.12.) Therefore, the definition of man as a rational animal, which is his nature, does not change after the fall, and thus original sin is something added to that nature.  We can see something similar with Calvin’s understanding of nature and grace.  He explains that some gifts are natural but others are above nature:

I feel pleased with the well-known saying which has been borrowed from the writings of Augustine, that man’s natural gifts were corrupted by sin, and his supernatural gifts withdrawn; meaning by supernatural gifts the light of faith and righteousness, which would have been sufficient for the attainment of heavenly life and everlasting felicity. Man, when he withdrew his allegiance to God, was deprived of the spiritual gifts by which he had been raised to the hope of eternal salvation. Hence it follows, that he is now an exile from the kingdom of God, so that all things which pertain to the blessed life of the soul are extinguished in him until he recover them by the grace of regeneration. Among these are faith, love to God, charity towards our neighbour, the study of righteousness and holiness. All these, when restored to us by Christ, are to be regarded as adventitious and above nature. If so, we infer that they were previously abolished. (Institutes, Henry Beveridge, trans., II.II.12.)

In this paragraph Calvin affirms both a sin/grace distinction and a nature/grace distinction, or more properly a nature/supernatural distinction.  Adam was created with certain supernatural gifts added to his natural gifts in order that he attain a supernatural end.  After the fall this nature/supernatural distinction in gifts does not disappear but a new category is added, that of sin. Therefore, we can tentatively conclude that Calvin did not consider Adam’s original righteousness to be purely natural, not needing the addition of grace (as Bavinck implies),  nor can we reduce his soteriology to a mere sin/grace distinction.  Because Adam was created with supernatural gifts we can say that these gifts were natural (I think this is what Bavinck means by the term) and in this sense no addition was needed.  However, this does not mean that these gifts were produced from nature, but that Adam had a natural capacity to receive them.  Adam’s faith, hope, and charity were not products of nature but were given supernaturally by God at the time of creation. 

I believe that a nature/grace  distinction (as opposed to a sin/grace distinction) within the writings of Calvin and Vermigli is difficult to find because they considered the removal of original righteousness to be a sin in and of itself, as Calvin mentions in the quote above. Therefore, a post-lapsarian sin/grace distinction is the same as a post-lapsarian nature/grace distinction because  a nature without grace in this world is a corrupt nature.  Because Calvin uses the word “nature” in reference to Adam’s originally righteous state he can say that any removal of grace is a corruption of nature, rather than a return to a state of pure nature. Also, the use of the word “nature” when distinguished from “grace” denotes a metaphysical definition, something that Calvin sought to avoid in order to be perspicuous.  In the next post I will discuss Thomas Aquinas’s understanding of this topic and compare texts from he, Vermigli and Calvin in which they discuss Adam’s original state.       

Vermigli Contra Pighius’s Doctrine of Pure Nature

APHenri de Lubac is known for his work exposing the doctrine held by many 16th century Catholic theologians that man was created in a state of pure nature. The more extreme position stated that Adam was created upright with superadded grace and that when he fell he received his old nature back. Thus, any defect in nature was there before grace was added and returned after it was removed. Albert Pighius, the 16th century Dutch Roman Catholic theologian held to this position and was heavily criticized by Peter Martyr Vermigli, who affirms the essence of the latter’s opinion here:

Adam was so created of God, that he was capable of that supernatural felicitie; who nevertheles setting light by the commandments of God, was despoiled of all those supernaturall gifts, and was left to the first state of his owne nature.  And in the same state we also are procreated, and so for his sinne are we damned, doo die, and are banished out of the kindgome of heaven, suffering manie discommodities, which are derived from the originals of our nature.  Wherefore we may complaine of our first parents, but not of God; for he was most liberall unto him:  and especiallie, seeing he calleth us againe unto himselfe (which is the highest felicitie) by his onelie sonne, and him would have to suffer death for our salvation. (Common Places, II.I.5.)

Vermigli continues, proclaiming his disagreement with this position:

But let not Pighius obiect against me, that these things come of the originals of nature; for these originals be not of nature that is perfect, but of nature corrupt and depraved.  Neither ought he in this matter to bring a similitude of brute beasts; for man is created to be farre more excellent than brute beasts, and to be the ruler over them.  Indeed man had in himselfe originals, whereby he might desire things pleasant and commodious but not against reason and the word of God:  for, to have such forceable and violent affects, is not the propertie of men, but of beasts.  Over this, seeing our soule was immortall, and given from God, it requireth a bodie meet for the same; namelie, such as might be preserved for ever, least the soule should at anie time be constreined to be without the same.  So as we must not flie to the first grounds of nature; for it was not so ordeined at the first, as we now have it. (Ibid., II.I.6.)

Vermigli responds to the claims of Pighius that man’s defects are from the “originals of nature” that the defects that we experience now are from the corruption of sin. Man was created with “beastly” desires but in Adam’s original state these passions were not against reason or God’s word.  If man were created with these defects it would be difficult to distinguish his substantial nature from that of irrational animals. Vermigli concludes his argument, stating that Pighius’s position leaves God culpable for creating man with wicked passions.

The Perfection of the Will: Another Example of Vermigli’s Thomism

Many within the more voluntarist strain of Christianity like to use slogans about conversion like “God dragged me kicking and screaming.”  This is usually meant to emphasize the person’s Calvinistic orthodoxy over the heterodoxy of those Arminian devils.  This is an extreme position.  Vermigli demonstrates the medium:  God doesn’t just idly propose that sinful man change his mind, as if supernatural truths were like sweet and sour pork at the Chinese buffet – take it or leave it.  Neither does God force man’s will to the extent that his choice in accepting the Gospel is involuntary.  That is a corruption of the will.  Vermigli explains:

Just as the senses cannot apprehend universals, so our mind cannot ascend to supernatural things vitiated and corrupt.  Some assert that it is enough to have the word and promises of God suggested to us by the Spirit.  I deny it, for unless these powers are corrected, we are quite unable to understand and embrace things divine and heavenly.  Nor is it within our capacity to be content with what is set before us; they must be proposed to us with force, efficacy, and power, so that the understanding may be affected with an uncommon light, and the will strengthened lest it submit to evil desires and temptations that call it away from spiritual things.  When this is done it assents to the words and promises of God, and justification follows. (Peter Martyr Vermigli, Philosophical Works, p. 285.)  

Vermigli does not say that God forces the will but that he proposes divine things “with force” etc.  He affirms that the intellect and will of man play an active part in this process: 

The intellect is actively predisposed to such assent, willing and agreeing to what is proposed; but it remains passive toward that power of God, the force and efficacy which heals and converts it; for through him all this is received and comes about.  Nor should this seem absurd, since as Scripture says, we are drawn, indicating a kind of passion and disposition.  It is also said that God stands at the door and knocks.  Hence those knocks and motions are received in the mind…” (Ibid.)

Not only does Vermigli present here St. Thomas’s distinction between active and passive willing, but the principle that governs his belief that God does not force the will is that “grace does not destroy but perfects nature.” (ST I, Q. 1, a. 8.) Vermigli says that God “does not compel or force, as if to corrupt the will or choice; rather he perfects it, since he adorns with form and fulfills matter but does not destroy it.” (Ibid., p. 286.)  The editors of Vermigli’s Philosophical Works include the Latin for comparison:

Vermigli:  potius perficit, quemadmodum forma ornat et absoluit materiam, non perdit.

Thomas:  Gratia naturam non tollit sed perficit.

The Magistrate Should Encourage Virtue

(I’ll preface this post by saying that my knowledge of political science is meager.  I also must admit complete ignorance about the economic workings of the stock market.  Just thinking about it intimidates me and reduces my being to the level of a primate – much like those in 2001: A Space Odyssey who when faced with the obelisk could do nothing more than screech and bang the ground with clubs.)

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I agree with Ron Paul, who was interviewed by Neil Cavuto this past Thursday, that our society does not need the government to act and act now to correct the perilous economic situation that is upon us.  Paul said we must change our philosophy of government in toto.  I agree in at least one respect:  the philosophy of government that says the citizen must ultimately depend on Washington for the worth of his hard earned money is the same philosophy that leads Washington to encourage the vice of frivolity among businessmen, congressional leaders, and the citizens themselves.  I received an economic stimulus check back in May (I think that’s when it was).  I was very tempted to spend the money in a different country just to prove the contradiction in the philosophy that on one hand says “the government must regulate the economy (by handing out cash)” and on the other hand says “the citizens must regulate the economy (by spending money).”  What the government really wants is a virtuous citizen who will invest in the businesses of his country out of a genuine love for that country.  This is why Peter Martyr considered ethics to be more primary than economics and politics.  He says:

Among these moral subjects, the first place is surely held by ethics, then economics, and finally politics.  I see this order as circular.  Through ethics, those who are its students will, one by one, become good men.  If they prove upright, they will raise good families; if the families are properly established, they will in turn create good republics.  And in good republics, both law and administration will aim at nothing less than each man becoming a good citizen, for they have eyes not only for the body but also for the spirit, and they will take care that citizens live according to virtue. (Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, p. 12)

But, our government does not want virtuous citizens.  They say “here’s a check for $600!  Now, don’t spend it in Mexico or by paying off your credit card because that will not help your country.”  I think it is great that they do not want me spending my stimulus check in a different country, but why shouldn’t I use it to pay off debt? Well, because if everybody used their stimulus check to pay their credit card debt or student loans then there’d be no new money pumped into the economy and businesses would be forced to close their doors and men and women would lose their jobs and then nobody would be happy.  They’ve made the vice of frugal spending a virtue and wedded this vice to the virtue of patriotism!  Anyone who knows anything about ethics knows that virtuous living is the essence of freedom.  So, can we really say that our government leaders promote the freedom of their fellow citizens whom they’ve sworn to protect when they not only sit passively by while we all become slaves to debt but join in the fight, taking the side of the banks and credit card companies – even becoming their spokesmen by encouraging people to spend money that is not theirs instead of being wise by saving for the future?  

They show no regard for the future and no common sense when they preach that deficit spending is the only option to get our nation out of financial trouble!  That’s like saying “I should take out a $200 loan because I can’t afford groceries,” but instead of buying the essentials I go lay the whole thing down on a craps game. Where have all the wise men gone?  I don’t know much about politics, but I do know that when leaders decide to redefine virtue they stand on a precarious ledge. They are in danger of destroying the very thing they’ve sworn to protect.